Las Vegas Sands Corp (LVS)

Conclusion

Las Vegas Sands operates integrated resorts in Macao and Singapore, including Marina Bay Sands, with accommodation, gaming, retail, convention facilities and dining. On 2026-11-09 the share price was 40.18 USD, giving a market capitalisation of 26.0 billion USD and an enterprise value of 38.6 billion USD.

The verdict is undervalued. The price-to-earnings multiple is 15.9, against a ten-year median of 23.1, a premium of -31.1%. EV/EBITDA is 8.7 against a median of 12.8, a premium of -32.2%. The DCF gives 88.48 USD per share at a discount rate of 8.9%. The fair value band runs from 63.65 to 95.47 USD with a midpoint of 79.56 USD, a margin of safety of 98.0%. The fair value from historical multiples is 70.64 USD. The reverse DCF implies revenue growth of -2.45% a year, while revenue grew at a compound rate of 34.7% over five years and 46.9% over three.

What supports the case is the return on capital: ROIC of 20.4% against a WACC of 7.1%, a difference of 13.3%. The Piotroski score is 8 of 9, and free cash flow conversion over the trailing twelve months is 147.4%. What would break it is the earnings trend: EPS compound growth is -0.7% over three years. Net debt to EBITDA is 2.82, the current ratio is 0.83, and current-year estimates were cut by 9.0% over ninety days.

Financial health

Financial health is yellow, because none of the four core metrics reads as good or bad; all are neutral. Net debt to EBITDA is 2.82, interest coverage is 3.94, the current ratio is 0.83 and the quick ratio is 0.76. Debt to equity is not available. The company reports negative equity, and its equity multiplier is 13.79. The Altman Z-score is 2.32, in the grey zone. That model was designed for manufacturers, so it is only a rough guide for a resort operator. Insolvency risk: medium, about 3.95% by the estimate of the Ohlson model over one to two years. The company's cash flow and interest cover are the main protection against that level of risk.

Earnings quality

Earnings quality is yellow: the Piotroski score of 8 of 9 and the 1.9% fall in share count over five years are good, but five-year free cash flow conversion of 57.6% is bad. Trailing free cash flow conversion is 147.4%, far above the five-year figure, and the accrual ratio is -6.6%, which points to cash-backed earnings. Stock-based compensation is 0.49% of revenue, and free cash flow after it is 2.35 billion USD. The Beneish M-score is not available. Over the last eight quarters the company beat estimates five times and missed three times, with an average surprise of 6.8%. Estimates are being cut: the current year has been revised down 9.0% over ninety days, with nine downgrades and one upgrade in the last thirty days, and next year is down 12.6% over the same period.

Profitability

Profitability is green, because all four profitability signals are assessed good. Gross margin is 49.9% against a ten-year median of 49.4%, operating margin is 22.3% against 22.5%, and net margin is 12.1% against 13.9%. ROIC is 20.4% against a WACC of 7.1%, with a five-year median ROIC of 16.8%. The return on equity is not shown as a value. The DuPont split explains why: a net margin of 12.5% and asset turnover of 0.59 are combined with an equity multiplier of 13.79. Much of the equity return therefore comes from leverage, not only from operations. The return on invested capital is the more reliable measure of this business.

Growth

Growth is yellow, because revenue growth is assessed good and the next-year EPS estimate of 9.95% is good, while the three-year EPS trend is bad and revenue consistency is neutral. Revenue compound growth is 46.9% over three years, 34.7% over five years and 1.1% over ten years. Revenue grew in six of the last ten comparable years. EPS compound growth is -0.7% over three years and -0.5% over ten years, and free cash flow per share grew 0.6% a year over ten years. The recent revenue rebound has not yet reached per-share earnings, and the falling estimates weigh on the outlook.

Valuation

Valuation is green, because the verdict signal is assessed good. The verdict is undervalued. Against ten-year medians, the price-to-earnings multiple is 15.9 against 23.1, a premium of -31.1%; EV/EBITDA is 8.7 against 12.8, a premium of -32.2%; price to free cash flow is 10.8 against 19.5, a premium of -44.8%; and price to sales is 1.9 against 4.1, a premium of -53.0%. The DCF is 88.48 USD per share at a discount rate of 8.9%, with 58.8% of its value in the terminal value, so it should be read with caution. The fair value band is 63.65 to 95.47 USD with a midpoint of 79.56 USD, and the fair value from historical multiples is 70.64 USD. These are estimates built on fixed assumptions, not price targets. The reverse DCF implies -2.45% growth, against a five-year revenue compound growth of 34.7%. The dividend yield is 3.4%, with a payout of 36.9% of free cash flow.

Risks

The main risk is leverage. Net debt to EBITDA of 2.82 and interest coverage of 3.94 leave little room if operating earnings fall, and negative equity means the balance sheet has no accounting cushion. A lower current ratio of 0.83 means the company depends on continuing cash generation to meet short-term obligations. The falling earnings estimates, with the current year down 9.0%, would weaken the free cash flow that supports the dividend and the valuation case. The debt-to-equity ratio, the Beneish M-score and the return on equity are not available. This analysis has no debt maturity schedule and no revenue split by segment, so it cannot show how the Macao and Singapore operations contribute to earnings or when debt falls due.